HIPAA backup requirements: what the rule says, what's proposed, what auditors want
What the HIPAA Security Rule requires for backups under 164.308(a)(7), what the proposed 2025 update would change and where it stands, plus encryption, BAAs, retention and the evidence an MSP serving clinics needs for an auditor.
Updated: November 2026
HIPAA never tells a clinic to "back up nightly to an immutable cloud vault," so every MSP with a dental or medical client ends up translating vague rule text into a real backup design. The rule asks for three things: exact copies of patient data you can get back, a way to restore them, and a way to keep working while systems are down. This guide maps each HIPAA backup requirement to what you build, what the proposed 2025 update would change, and what to hand an auditor when one calls.
TL;DR
- The rule. HIPAA's contingency plan standard, 45 CFR 164.308(a)(7), requires a data backup plan, a disaster recovery plan and an emergency mode operation plan.
- The addressable parts. Testing and criticality analysis must be done or a written reason kept.
- The proposed update. 48-hour backups, 72-hour restores, monthly restore tests, final action projected for July 2027.
- The vendors. A backup provider storing ePHI needs a BAA.
- The proof. Auditors want restore logs, not policies.
What the HIPAA Security Rule requires for backups today
The Security Rule protects electronic protected health information (ePHI): patient data that lives on a server, a laptop, an EHR database or a cloud tenant. Backups sit under the contingency plan standard in 45 CFR 164.308(a)(7). It applies to covered entities (the clinic) and to business associates (you, if you manage their systems).
The standard has five parts. HHS labels each one "required" or "addressable."
| Implementation specification | Status | What it means in practice | Evidence an auditor asks for |
|---|---|---|---|
| Data backup plan | Required | Retrievable, exact copies of ePHI | Backup scope, schedule, job reports |
| Disaster recovery plan | Required | Procedures to restore any lost data | Written restore runbook with owners |
| Emergency mode operation plan | Required | Keep critical work going and ePHI protected during an outage | Downtime procedure, paper forms, contact tree |
| Testing and revision procedures | Addressable | Test the plans periodically and fix what breaks | Dated test records and plan revisions |
| Applications and data criticality analysis | Addressable | Rank systems by how much the clinic needs them | A ranked list: EHR, imaging, billing, email |
"Addressable" trips people up. It doesn't mean optional. Under HHS's Security Rule guidance, an entity must assess whether the safeguard is reasonable and appropriate, then either do it, do an equivalent, or write down why neither fits. An untested backup with no written reason for skipping the test is a gap, not a choice.
Two smaller rules touch backups too. The physical safeguards include a data backup and storage specification: make a retrievable copy of ePHI before you move equipment. That covers the server you're swapping out on a Saturday. And the risk analysis in 164.308(a)(1) is required. It's the document that's supposed to justify every backup decision above.
One caveat before the details. This is a practical read of the rule, not legal advice, so check anything client-specific with the clinic's compliance counsel.
How often HIPAA says to back up (it doesn't)
The current rule sets no backup frequency, no retention period and no recovery time. Your client's risk analysis sets them. That's flexible, and it also means the auditor will ask why you picked what you picked.
Two numbers do the work. RPO (recovery point objective) is how much data the clinic can afford to lose, measured in time. RTO (recovery time objective) is how long it can run without the system. A family practice that books 40 appointments a day can't lose a day of EHR notes. So hourly snapshots of the EHR database and a same-day restore target are easy to defend. Nightly backups of a file share with old scanned forms are easy to defend too.
Write the reasoning down next to the number. "EHR: RPO 1 hour, RTO 4 hours, because the clinic sees patients from 8 to 6 and can run on paper for one morning" is the sentence an auditor wants. Our data backup plan template walks through building that document per system.
Ransomware turned backups into a breach question
HHS settled the ransomware question years ago. Its ransomware fact sheet says that when ransomware encrypts ePHI, it's presumed a breach unless the entity can show a low probability that the data was compromised. A good backup doesn't make the notification duty go away. It keeps the clinic open while you work through it.
Enforcement keeps landing on the same failure. On April 23, 2026, OCR settled four ransomware investigations for a combined $1,165,000, covering more than 428,000 people across a women's health group, an imaging provider, a benefits administrator and a health plan. In at least two of them, OCR found no accurate and thorough risk analysis. OCR Director Paula M. Stannard put it plainly: "Hacking and ransomware are the most frequent type of large breach reported to OCR."
The practical takeaway for backups: attackers go for the backup console first. Keep one copy that the production admin account can't delete, on separate credentials with MFA. Our guide to immutable backups covers how object lock and air gaps stop ransomware from wiping your recovery.
The 2025 proposed security rule update, and where it stands
On January 6, 2025, HHS published a proposed rule to overhaul the Security Rule (90 Fed. Reg. 898). For backups, it swaps "decide what's reasonable" for numbers. Per summaries from Davis Wright Tremaine and Crowell & Moring, the proposal would:
- keep retrievable copies of ePHI no more than 48 hours old;
- restore critical systems and data within 72 hours of a loss;
- run test restores at least monthly, and test backup controls every six months;
- review and test the contingency plan at least once every 12 months;
- make business associates tell the covered entity within 24 hours when they activate their own contingency plan;
- encrypt ePHI at rest and in transit, require MFA, and keep a technology asset inventory and network map;
- remove the "addressable" label, so nearly every specification becomes required.
The status is the part vendors blur. As of November 2026, it's still a proposal. It drew nearly 5,000 comments, and in December 2025 a coalition of more than 100 healthcare organizations led by CHIME asked HHS to withdraw it, per Troutman Pepper Locke. HHS's regulatory agenda then moved the rule (RIN 0945-AA22) to its long-term actions list with final action projected for July 2027, as Fierce Healthcare reported. Agenda dates are estimates, so it could land earlier, change, or stall.
If it's finalized as proposed, the rule takes effect 60 days after publication and compliance is due 180 days after that. The current rule applies until then.
Building to the proposed numbers now costs little. A 48-hour RPO and a monthly restore test are already what a clinic needs to survive ransomware. Design to them and you won't redo the work in 2028.
Encryption, addressable today and expected tomorrow
Encryption is addressable under the current rule, for data at rest (164.312(a)(2)(iv)) and in transit (164.312(e)(2)(ii)). The proposed rule would make both required. Either way, there's a strong reason to encrypt backups now.
Encryption is the breach safe harbor. HHS breach notification guidance says ePHI encrypted to NIST standards isn't "unsecured." So a lost backup drive that's properly encrypted, with the key stored elsewhere, isn't a reportable breach. An unencrypted one is.
The setup that holds up is simple. AES-256 at rest on the backup target. TLS for every transfer to offsite storage. Keys held outside the backup vault, so whoever steals the vault doesn't also get the key. Write down where the keys live and who can reach them.
BAAs, and who needs one in the backup chain
A business associate is anyone who creates, receives, keeps or sends ePHI for a covered entity. An MSP that manages a clinic's servers, EHR workstations or Microsoft 365 tenant is one. Since the HITECH Act, OCR can go after business associates directly, not just through the clinic.
The chain doesn't stop with you. Your backup vendor, your offsite storage provider and any cloud host holding the copies are subcontractor business associates. That holds even when the data is encrypted and the provider has no key. HHS's cloud computing guidance says a provider storing ePHI is a business associate even with "no-view" service. So the chain runs clinic to MSP to backup vendor, with a BAA at each link. A vendor that won't sign one can't hold ePHI.
Two BAA clauses matter most for backups. The BAA must require return or destruction of PHI when the contract ends (45 CFR 164.504(e)), and that includes every backup copy. And breach notice from a business associate is due without unreasonable delay, no later than 60 days after discovery.
MSPs don't always accept the role without a fight. This r/msp thread runs the same argument under UK GDPR: a client hiring an MSP for backup and RMM, an MSP insisting only Microsoft processes the data. The replies are near-unanimous, and they map straight onto HIPAA.
Retention, where six years is about paperwork
The "six years" number gets misread. It comes from 45 CFR 164.316(b)(2): keep Security Rule documentation for six years from when it was created or last in effect, whichever is later. That's your policies, risk analyses, test records and BAAs. It isn't a rule about how long to keep backup copies of patient records.
How long the clinic keeps the medical records themselves is a state law question, and it varies by state and by patient age. Backup retention should cover the longest of three things: the state's record retention period, the clinic's own policy, and how far back you'd need to restore after a ransomware infection sat quietly for months.
In practice, keep short-term restore points for fast recovery and long-term copies on a separate schedule. Keep the restore test logs for six years, since they're documentation. Email is its own case, because an archive and a backup answer different retention questions.
What an MSP serving clinics must show an auditor
OCR investigations start with documents. If a clinic gets a letter after a breach, the request will land on your desk within days. Build the evidence pack before anyone asks:
- Risk analysis. It names the backup systems, the threats to them and the controls in place.
- Contingency plan. It covers backup, disaster recovery and emergency mode, with a version number and review dates.
- Criticality ranking. The EHR, imaging, scheduling and billing systems, in restore order, with RPO and RTO for each.
- Backup job history. Success and failure reports for the review period, with failures followed up.
- Restore test records. Date, system, who ran it, how long it took, and whether the data opened.
- Encryption and access. Settings for at-rest and in-transit encryption, key location, and MFA on the backup console.
- The BAA chain. Signed agreements with the clinic and with every subcontractor that touches ePHI.
- Emergency mode procedure. How the front desk checks patients in when the EHR is down.
The restore test records carry the most weight. A policy says you meant to. A log with timestamps says you did. Our guide to disaster recovery testing covers the five test types and how often to run each.
Collecting that evidence is where the hours go when you serve twenty clinics instead of two. In OpenFrame, a scheduled script can check backup agent status on every device in a client's group and keep each run in execution history. That gives you a timestamped record per client without anyone pasting screenshots into a binder. If you're weighing a formal attestation for your own MSP on top of client compliance, our take on SOC 2 for MSPs runs the numbers.
The short version
HIPAA asks for three required plans: backup, disaster recovery and emergency mode. It asks you to test them or explain why not. It asks you to prove all of it on paper, and to have a BAA with everyone holding a copy. The 2025 proposal turns that into 48 hours, 72 hours and monthly tests, and it isn't law yet.
Build to the proposed numbers anyway. Encrypt the backups, keep one copy the admin account can't delete, and test a restore every month. The clinic that can open yesterday's charts at 9 a.m. on ransomware day has better odds with OCR, and a much better morning.
Next, read how to put the whole program in writing in our guide to what IT compliance means and who owns the evidence.

Aliaska Varieva
VP of Engineering
Hi! I’m Aliaska, and I’ve been working as a software engineer (mostly Java + a bit Kotlin) for over 8 years now. I mostly spend my time building backend services, integrating systems, fixing bugs (the fun part 🙃), and making sure things don’t fall apart behind the scenes.
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