Security audit procedures: a step-by-step checklist for IT teams
For IT teams and MSPs: the nine audit steps against NIST CSF 2.0, CIS Controls v8.1 or ISO/IEC 27001:2022, how to prepare when an outside auditor is coming, what a critical infrastructure audit adds, and a 24-row checklist with the evidence to keep.
Updated: November 2026
Someone asks for a security audit, and the first week disappears into arguing about what it covers. A good audit is a set of repeatable steps: agree the scope, pick the yardstick, collect evidence, test, rate what you find and follow it to closure. This guide walks through the nine security audit procedures in order, with a checklist an IT team or MSP can run internally or hand to an outside auditor.
TL;DR
- A security audit checks your controls against a standard and proves it with evidence. It's broader than a vulnerability scan and less aggressive than a penetration test.
- Decide three things before fieldwork: the scope, the framework you'll audit against (NIST CSF 2.0, CIS Controls v8.1 or ISO/IEC 27001:2022) and who signs off on the findings.
- Evidence beats answers. Screenshots, exports and samples settle what interviews only claim.
- The technical checks that find the most problems are the dull ones: admin group membership, service account passwords, firewall rules nobody owns, MFA gaps and untested restores.
- Rate every finding with the same method, give each one an owner and a date, and re-test before you close it.
- Run a full audit once a year, access reviews every quarter and vulnerability scans every month.
- Being audited by someone else? Run the same checklist against their framework first, gather evidence that covers the audit period, and name one person to coordinate requests.
What a security audit is, and what it isn't
A security audit compares how your environment works today against a defined standard. The standard can be a framework, a regulation, a contract or your own security policy. The output is a list of findings, each backed by evidence.
Three other activities get called an audit, and they answer different questions.
A vulnerability scan asks which known weaknesses exist on the systems a scanner can reach. It's automated and runs often. A penetration test asks what an attacker could do with those weaknesses, and a tester proves it by exploiting them. A risk assessment asks which threats matter most to the business and what they would cost.
An audit uses all three as inputs. It then goes further and checks whether the processes around them work. A scanner can tell you a server is missing a patch. An audit asks why the patch process missed it, and whether it's missing on forty other servers too.
Types of security audit
Audits split along three lines: who runs them, why they run, and what they test.
| Type | Who runs it | Typical trigger | What you get |
|---|---|---|---|
| Internal (first-party) | Your own IT or security team | Annual plan, leadership request | Candid findings, low cost, limited independence |
| Customer or supplier (second-party) | A client auditing you, or you auditing a vendor | Contract, security questionnaire | Proof for one relationship |
| External (third-party) | Independent auditor or certification body | Certification, regulation, insurance | An opinion others will trust |
| Compliance audit | Any of the above | ISO 27001, SOC 2, PCI DSS, HIPAA, FTC Safeguards Rule | Pass or fail against named requirements |
| Technical audit | Internal team or specialist firm | New system, merger, incident | Configuration and exposure findings |
Internal audits are the cheapest way to get ready for an external one. The same procedures apply to both. The difference is independence: an outside auditor's signature carries weight with customers, insurers and regulators that your own report doesn't.
If you're auditing a vendor rather than being audited, the same steps work. Our guide to vendor risk management covers the questionnaire side of second-party audits.
What's involved in a critical infrastructure security audit?
A critical infrastructure audit follows the nine steps below, with three differences: a sector rule sets the yardstick, operational technology (OT) joins the scope, and the testing gets more careful.
The rule comes from the sector. In North America, the bulk electric system is held to the NERC CIP standards, and NERC's Regional Entities audit registered entities against them through its compliance monitoring program. In the EU, the NIS2 Directive covers essential and important entities in sectors such as energy, transport, health and drinking water. It also names managed service providers, so an MSP serving those clients can be in scope itself.
OT joins the scope. Controllers, SCADA servers and the engineering workstations that program them sit next to the IT estate, and the audit maps both. NIST's guide to OT security (SP 800-82 Rev. 3) and the IEC 62443 series for industrial automation and control systems supply the controls for this part. The boundary between IT and OT, and every remote access path across it, including vendor support connections, gets the closest look.
Testing turns passive. An authenticated scan that is routine on an office network can disrupt older controllers, and SP 800-82 Rev. 3 tells OT owners to take extreme caution before allowing active scans on a live network. So the technical step leans on configuration exports, network diagrams and passive traffic monitoring, with any active testing done on a lab copy or inside an agreed maintenance window. Where no sector rule applies, CISA's voluntary performance goals give a baseline to audit against.
Step 1: set the scope and the objective
Scope decides whether the audit finishes. Write it down in one page before anything else happens.
Start with the objective in one sentence. "Confirm we meet CIS Controls IG1 before the insurance renewal" is an objective. "Check our security" isn't.
Then list what's in and what's out. Name the sites, the business units, the systems and the cloud tenants. Name the period under review, since a control that worked last week may not have worked in March. Name the out-of-scope items too, with a reason, so nobody assumes they were checked.
Last, agree who owns the result. Someone with authority has to accept the scope at the start and the findings at the end. On a small team that's usually the IT lead and one business owner. Without that person, findings turn into a debate about whether they count.
Step 2: pick the framework you'll audit against
An audit needs a yardstick, and a framework gives you one that someone else already argued over. Three fit small and mid-sized teams.
NIST CSF 2.0, released on 26 February 2024, organizes security into six functions: Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond and Recover. Govern is new in 2.0. It's broad and outcome-based, which makes it good for a first audit and for reporting to leadership. The NIST CSF 2.0 release describes each function.
CIS Controls v8.1 is prescriptive. It lists 18 controls and 153 safeguards, grouped into three implementation groups. CIS describes IG1 as "essential cyber hygiene", the set every organization should start with. For a technical audit on a small budget, IG1 is the most practical checklist available.
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 is a certifiable management system standard. Its Annex A has 93 controls in four themes: organizational, people, physical and technological. Organizations certified to the 2013 version had until 31 October 2025 to move to the 2022 version. Pick it when a customer or a tender asks for the certificate.
You don't need all three. A common pattern is CIS IG1 for the technical checks and CSF 2.0 for the report to leadership. Our cybersecurity frameworks list compares the wider field, including NIST 800-171, SOC 2 and HIPAA.
Step 3: plan the fieldwork
Fieldwork is the part where evidence gets collected and tested. Planning it well saves the most time.
Build a request list first. Auditors call it a PBC list, "provided by client". It names every document, export and screenshot you'll need, who provides it and by when. Send it two weeks before fieldwork starts. The items that arrive late are the ones that reveal gaps.
Agree the rules of engagement for technical testing. Write down which systems can be scanned, from where, when, and who to call if a scan knocks something over. Get that approval in writing from the system owner.
Decide how evidence moves. Use one shared folder with restricted access, not email attachments. And settle what the auditor will never receive. A legitimate audit reviews settings, logs and account lists. It never needs live passwords.
That last point trips people up. This r/sysadmin thread describes a request to hand over a list of credentials "to show security compliance". Treat any request like that as a red flag, whoever it claims to come from, and verify it through a contact you already know.
Step 4: collect evidence
Evidence is what separates an audit from a conversation. Every conclusion in the report should point to something you can show.
Good evidence has three qualities. It's relevant to the control being tested. It's reliable, meaning it came from the system rather than from someone's memory. And it's sufficient, meaning there's enough of it to support the conclusion.
Four kinds cover most controls:
- Documents: policies, procedures, network diagrams, asset registers, contracts.
- System exports: user lists, group memberships, firewall rule sets, patch reports, backup job logs. Exports straight from the system are stronger than reports someone typed up.
- Screenshots: configuration pages, with the date, time and system name visible in the frame.
- Samples: a set of real records tested against the control, such as ten leavers from the last quarter checked for disabled accounts.
Sampling keeps the work finite. You don't check every leaver. You pick a sample across the period, test each one, and extrapolate. If one in ten fails, the control fails, and the finding says so with the sample attached.
Log every item in an evidence register: what it is, which control it supports, who provided it and when. Six months later, when someone asks how you reached a finding, the register answers.
Collecting the same export from forty machines by hand is where audits stall. Flamingo, which publishes this guide, builds OpenFrame: open, AI-native infrastructure for IT and security. It can run the collection script across a client's or department's devices and pull the output into one place, at $1 per device a month with a 14-day free trial.
Security training audit evidence
Awareness training is a control auditors sample like any other, and each framework in Step 2 names it: CIS Control 14, the PR.AT category in NIST CSF 2.0 and Annex A control 6.3 in ISO/IEC 27001:2022. Regulations repeat it. The FTC Safeguards Rule, for one, requires security awareness training for staff.
Evidence that settles a training control:
- The requirement: the policy that says who is trained, on what and how often, including new starters and admins.
- Completion records: an export from the training platform with each person's name, course and completion date, so each name can be checked.
- A sample against the directory: ten people, including recent starters, each matched to a dated completion record inside the required window.
- Phishing simulation results: click and report rates across several campaigns, plus the follow-up given to people who clicked.
- Role-based training: records for admins, developers and anyone who handles payment or health data, where the framework or a regulation asks for more.
When this control fails, check the records before the training: the course may have run with no export of who finished it. Our guide to awareness training covers how to run a program that produces those records.
Step 5: run interviews and walkthroughs
Interviews tell you how a process is supposed to work. Walkthroughs show you how it works.
Interview the people who run the controls, not only the people who own them. The service desk lead knows how account requests get approved. The person who restores files knows whether backups get tested. Ask open questions: "Walk me through the last time a user left", not "Do you disable accounts for leavers?"
Then ask them to show you. Pick one real case and follow it through the systems. An offboarding walkthrough might take you from the HR ticket, to the directory, to the email tenant, to the VPN, to the password manager. Every handover in that chain is a place where a step gets skipped.
Write down the gap between the stated process and the observed one. That gap is often the most useful finding in the report, because it explains why the technical problems exist.
Step 6: test the technical controls
Technical testing checks the configuration directly. NIST's guide on the subject, SP 800-115, groups the methods into reviewing documents and settings, finding targets, and validating vulnerabilities. For an internal audit, six areas carry most of the risk.
Privileged access. List every member of the admin groups and ask why each one is there. On Active Directory, start with:
powershellGet-ADGroupMember "Domain Admins" -Recursive | Select-Object Name, SamAccountName Get-ADUser -Filter {Enabled -eq $true} -Properties LastLogonDate, PasswordLastSet | Where-Object { $_.LastLogonDate -lt (Get-Date).AddDays(-90) } | Select-Object SamAccountName, LastLogonDate, PasswordLastSet
The second command finds enabled accounts nobody has used in 90 days. Cross-check that list against HR's leavers. Check service accounts separately: their passwords rarely change, and they often hold far more rights than the job needs. Our guide to role-based access control covers how to redesign those rights once you've found them.
MFA coverage. Confirm MFA on email, VPN, remote access tools and every cloud admin portal. Look for the exceptions, since each one is a bypass.
Vulnerabilities and patching. Run an authenticated scan, which logs in to read installed software, not just an external one. Compare the results with your patch reports. According to Verizon's 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report, 31% of breaches now start with an exploited software vulnerability, ahead of stolen passwords. Prioritize internet-facing systems first. Our comparison of vulnerability management software covers tools for this step.
Secure configuration. Compare servers and endpoints with a hardening baseline such as the CIS Benchmarks. Check that local admin rights are removed from standard users and that endpoint protection is running on every device, not just most of them.
Network and firewall rules. Export the rule set. Flag any-to-any rules, rules nobody can explain and rules for systems that no longer exist. Check egress filtering too, since a network that blocks inbound traffic can still let everything out.
Logging and backup. Confirm the logs you'd need in an incident exist and are kept long enough. Then restore something. A backup job that reports success proves the job ran, not that the data comes back.
This checklist from r/sysadmin, posted by someone with more than ten years in network security, covers the same ground from a practitioner's side: firewall rules, admin accounts, service accounts and the leavers nobody disabled.
An internal audit usually stops short of exploiting what it finds. When you need proof of what an attacker could reach, bring in a tester. Our guide to network penetration testing explains what that engagement covers.
Step 7: rate the findings
A list of fifty findings with no ranking gets ignored. Rate every finding the same way so the team knows where to start.
Score each one on likelihood and impact. Likelihood asks how easy the weakness is to exploit and how exposed the system is. Impact asks what happens to the business if it's exploited: data lost, systems down, money gone, a regulator involved. Combine the two into four levels: critical, high, medium and low.
Write each finding in a fixed structure, so anyone can read it without the auditor in the room:
| Part | Question it answers | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Condition | What did you find? | 4 of 10 sampled leavers still had enabled accounts |
| Criteria | What should be true? | Policy: accounts disabled on the last working day |
| Cause | Why did it happen? | HR tickets don't reach IT for contractors |
| Effect | What's the risk? | Former staff could still sign in to email and VPN |
| Recommendation | What should change? | Add IT to the leaver workflow, review weekly |
Agree remediation targets by level before the report goes out. An illustrative set: critical in 7 days, high in 30, medium in 90, low at the next review. Your own targets should match your risk appetite and any contract or insurance terms.
Note what works too. A report that only lists failures reads as an attack, and the team defends instead of fixing. Controls that passed belong in the report, briefly.
Step 8: write the report
The report has two readers. Leadership reads the first page. The technical team reads the rest.
Open with a one-page summary: the objective, the scope, the overall result, the count of findings by level and the three findings that matter most. Leadership should be able to decide on budget and priorities from that page alone.
Then cover the method: the framework, the period, the sample sizes and anything that limited the work, such as a system you couldn't access. Put the findings next, sorted by level, each in the fixed structure above. End with the evidence register as an appendix.
Share a draft with the control owners before the final version. They'll correct factual errors and add management responses: whether they agree, what they'll do and by when. A finding with an agreed response gets fixed. A finding that arrives as a surprise gets argued.
Focal Point's internal audit team talks with cybersecurity leaders about audit's role in security, a useful primer for anyone running their first internal audit:
Step 9: track remediation and re-test
The audit ends when the findings close, not when the report ships.
Put every finding in a tracker with an owner, a due date and a status. The ticketing system you already use works fine. What matters is that someone reviews the list on a fixed schedule, usually every two weeks, and chases the overdue items.
Some findings won't get fixed. The cost is too high, or the system retires next year. Handle those with a formal risk acceptance: the business owner signs that they understand the risk and accept it until a named date. Accepted risk is a decision. An open finding nobody mentions is an oversight.
Re-test before closing. Ask for fresh evidence, not a note saying "done". If the finding was four enabled leaver accounts, the closing evidence is a new sample showing zero.
How to prepare for a security audit
When the auditor comes from outside, such as a customer, a certification body or an insurer, they run the steps above on you. Preparing means doing the same work first, so fieldwork confirms what you already know.
- Get the scope and the request list early. Ask which framework, which period, which systems and which sites. Ask for the request list, the PBC list from Step 3, as soon as the dates are set.
- Run your own audit against the same framework. A readiness review, also called a gap assessment, runs the checklist below with the auditor's framework as the yardstick. Every gap you find first is one you can fix or explain.
- Fix what you can, and accept the rest in writing. Close the quick findings. For the rest, record a formal risk acceptance as in Step 9, so the auditor sees a decision rather than a surprise.
- Collect evidence for the whole period. A SOC 2 Type II report covers how controls ran over months, so exports dated last week won't cover it. Build the evidence register from Step 4 before fieldwork starts.
- Name one coordinator. One person receives every request, tracks it and hands it to the right owner. Brief the control owners before their interviews: answer the question asked, show the evidence, and say "I'll check" rather than guess.
- Set up the evidence room. Use one shared folder with restricted access, organized by control, with read access for the auditor. Live passwords never go in it.
During fieldwork, keep a log of every request and what you provided. It becomes the starting evidence register for next year. Insurers ask for similar proof at renewal, and our guide to cyber insurance requirements lists it control by control.
Preparing a client for an audit as an MSP
When a client faces an audit, the request list reaches the MSP too, because the evidence lives in the tools the MSP runs: the RMM, the backup console, the email tenant and the firewall. Three habits make that week shorter.
- Agree who provides what in the contract. List the evidence the MSP supplies, such as patch reports, backup logs and admin group exports, and what the client owns, such as policies, HR leaver records and training records.
- Keep evidence per client, on a schedule. A monthly export of admin groups, MFA status and patch compliance covers the access and patching rows of a request list before it arrives.
- Expect to be in scope yourself. The MSP holds admin access to the client's systems, so a second-party audit can extend to the MSP's own controls, from MFA on its tools to how a departing technician's accounts are removed.
Regulated clients add their own rules on top. Our guide to co-managed IT in regulated industries covers how to split those duties in the agreement.
How often to run a security audit
A full audit once a year is the usual baseline. Some controls drift faster than that, so check them in between.
| What | How often | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Full internal security audit | Every 12 months | Baseline across all controls |
| Privileged and user access review | Every quarter | Leavers and role changes pile up |
| Vulnerability scan | Monthly, and after major changes | New CVEs appear weekly |
| Backup restore test | Quarterly | Backups fail quietly |
| Firewall rule review | Every 6 months | Temporary rules become permanent |
| Policy review | Every 12 months | Policies drift from practice |
| Targeted audit | After an incident, merger or new system | The risk changed |
Compliance adds its own clock. A SOC 2 Type II report covers controls over a period, typically three to twelve months, so the evidence has to exist across that whole window. Our guide to SOC 2 compliance covers what that means in practice. Regulations can also set the cadence directly: the FTC Safeguards Rule, for one, requires regular testing of safeguards and a written report to the board.
For planning the year of audits around those clocks, SANS Institute has a webcast on building a 2026 cybersecurity audit plan:
The security audit checklist
Use this as the working list for an internal audit. Each row names the area, what to check and the evidence to keep.
| Area | What to check | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Scope | Objective, systems, period and owner agreed | Signed scope document |
| Governance | Security policy exists, is approved and was reviewed this year | Policy with approval date |
| Asset inventory | Every device and cloud tenant is listed, with an owner | Inventory export vs discovery scan |
| Software inventory | Unauthorized and unsupported software identified | Software report, end-of-life list |
| Admin accounts | Each member of admin groups is justified | Group export with justification |
| Service accounts | Rights are minimal, passwords rotated | Account list with last password change |
| Leavers | Accounts disabled on exit | Sample of 10 leavers vs directory |
| MFA | Enforced on email, VPN, remote access, admin portals | Policy screenshots, exception list |
| Patching | Critical patches applied within the target window | Patch report, authenticated scan |
| Vulnerabilities | Findings tracked to closure | Scan results, ticket history |
| Configuration | Hardening baseline applied | Benchmark comparison report |
| Endpoint protection | Running and current on every device | Console export vs asset inventory |
| Local admin rights | Removed from standard users | Local group report |
| Firewall | No any-to-any rules, every rule has an owner | Rule export with review notes |
| Egress | Outbound traffic restricted | Firewall egress rules |
| Remote access | Only approved tools, with MFA | Tool list, access logs |
| Email security | SPF, DKIM and DMARC in place | DNS records, DMARC reports |
| Logging | Key logs collected and retained | Log sources list, retention settings |
| Backup | Jobs succeed and restores work | Job logs, restore test record |
| Incident response | Plan exists and was exercised | Plan, exercise notes |
| Awareness | Staff trained, phishing tested | Training records, test results |
| Vendors | Critical suppliers assessed | Vendor list, questionnaires |
| Physical | Server room and network closets secured | Access list, photos |
| Findings | Every finding rated, owned and dated | Findings tracker |
If you work to a specific regulation, map this list against it. Our FTC Safeguards Rule checklist shows what that mapping looks like for one rule.
IT department audit checklist: the wider controls
When the audit covers the whole IT department rather than security alone, auditors add the IT general controls: how changes, assets, licenses and services are run. Add these rows to the list above.
| Area | What to check | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Change management | Changes approved, tested and logged before release | Sample of 10 changes vs tickets and approvals |
| Asset lifecycle | Devices tracked from purchase to disposal | Asset register, disposal certificates |
| Software licensing | Installs match what you bought | Entitlements vs discovery report |
| Service desk | Tickets meet the agreed response and resolution targets | SLA report for the period |
| Disaster recovery | A recovery plan exists and was tested | DR plan, last test report |
| Vendor contracts | Each contract has an owner and a renewal date | Contract register |
| IT budget | Spend tracked against the approved budget | Budget vs actuals |
| Documentation | Runbooks and network diagrams are current | Document review dates |
| Acceptable use | Staff signed the acceptable use policy | Signed policy records |
Licensing can bring its own auditor, sent by the software vendor. Our software license audit guide covers that process from the first letter.
For the recovery row, our guide to disaster recovery testing covers the five test types and when to run each.
Mistakes that make an audit useless
The same few mistakes turn a week of work into a report nobody acts on:
- No agreed scope. The findings get dismissed as out of scope.
- Answers accepted as evidence. "Yes, we do that" isn't proof. A sample is.
- Findings without owners. Everyone agrees, nobody fixes.
- Closing on a promise. Without a re-test, "fixed" means "someone said so".
- Auditing your own work. The person who built the firewall shouldn't be the one who reviews its rules.
That last one is hard on a small team. If there's no one independent inside, swap audit areas between two people, or bring in an outside auditor for the areas you built yourself.
Run the audit, then close it
Security audit procedures come down to nine steps: scope, framework, plan, evidence, interviews, technical tests, rating, reporting and re-testing. The checklist above turns those steps into rows you can test, and the annual cadence keeps them from drifting back.
Start with CIS IG1 if this is your first audit, and keep the scope small enough to finish. For the governance side of the same work, read our guide to building an IT governance framework around NIST CSF 2.0.

Aliaska Varieva
VP of Engineering
Hi! I’m Aliaska, and I’ve been working as a software engineer (mostly Java + a bit Kotlin) for over 8 years now. I mostly spend my time building backend services, integrating systems, fixing bugs (the fun part 🙃), and making sure things don’t fall apart behind the scenes.
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